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ABSTRACT The Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene challenged Wisconsin laboratories to examine their biosafety practices and improve their culture of biosafety.
One hundred three clinical and public health laboratories completed a questionnairebased, microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment. Greater than 96% of the respondents performed activities related to specimen processing, direct microscopic
examination, and rapid nonmolecular testing, while approximately 60% performed
culture interpretation. Although they are important to the assessment of risk, data
speciﬁc to patient occupation, symptoms, and travel history were often unavailable
to the laboratory and, therefore, less contributory to a microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment than information on the specimen source and test requisition.
Over 88% of the respondents complied with more than three-quarters of the mitigation control measures listed in the survey. Facility assessment revealed that subsets
of laboratories that claim biosafety level 1, 2, or 3 status did not possess all of the
biosafety elements considered minimally standard for their respective classiﬁcations.
Many laboratories reported being able to quickly correct the minor deﬁciencies identiﬁed. Task assessment identiﬁed deﬁciencies that trended higher within the general
(not microbiology-speciﬁc) laboratory for core activities, such as packaging and shipping, direct microscopic examination, and culture modalities solely involving screens
for organism growth. For traditional microbiology departments, opportunities for improvement in the cultivation and management of highly infectious agents, such
as acid-fast bacilli and systemic fungi, were revealed. These results derived from
a survey of a large cohort of small- and large-scale laboratories suggest the necessity for continued microbiology-based understanding of biosafety practices,
vigilance toward biosafety, and enforcement of biosafety practices throughout
the laboratory setting.
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linical, public health, and research laboratories must constantly demonstrate vigilance in the context of hazards associated with the cultivation and propagation of
infectious agents. The scope of laboratory-acquired infections was the subject of a
recent review by Singh (1). On an historic basis, the most commonly reported
laboratory-associated infections included brucellosis, Q fever, hepatitis, typhoid fever,
tularemia, tuberculosis, dermatomycosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, psittacosis,
and coccidioidomycosis (2, 3), with case fatality rates ranging from ⬍0.5% (Q fever,
dermatomycosis) to ⬎7.5% (typhoid fever, psittacosis) (4). Contemporary surveys have
revealed that tuberculosis, brucellosis, and enteric infections (particularly shigellosis)
are among the most common laboratory-acquired infections (5, 6). Noteworthy for
Brucella spp. is an occupational infection risk (641 cases per 100,000 microbiologists)
that substantially exceeds that for the general population (0.08 cases per 100,000
individuals) (6). A similar disparity has been noted for Neisseria meningitidis. Moreover,
one cannot discount the impact of additional laboratory-acquired fungal (7–9), viral (7,
10–12), and parasitic (13, 14) agents of infection, as well as purported bioweapons (15),
on the landscape of biosafety.
In a regional U.S. survey conducted from 1978 to 1982, Jacobson et al. (16) reported
an annual laboratory-acquired infection incidence rate of 5.0 per 1,000 laboratorians
within small laboratories (deﬁned as ⱕ25 laboratorians), which is in contrast to a rate
of 1.5 per 1,000 laboratorians in larger laboratories (P ⬍ 0.05). On the other hand, a
survey of doctoral-level clinical microbiology directors (6) revealed that laboratories
serving clinical entities with ⬎200 beds reported more instances of exposure and
infections over a 3-year period than did perceived smaller laboratories. In this data set,
the greater proportion of laboratory-acquired infections caused by Shigella spp., Brucella spp., Salmonella spp., Staphylococcus aureus, Escherichia coli O157:H7, and Coccidioides immitis emanated from the larger laboratories. These variable data imply that
all laboratory professionals be trained to safely assess the risk of the tasks that they
perform.
Laboratory biosafety is a form of prospective risk management in which individuals
make judgments to avoid potentially negative outcomes while being cognizant of the
fact that the information provided may contain uncertainty. In this dynamic paradigm,
successful risk management and the prevention of laboratory-acquired infections may
be impacted by sample volume, microbial pathogenicity, routes of exposure, host
immune status, and the workload, knowledge, and experience of the individuals in the
laboratory (17). A formal biosafety risk assessment is a three-facet process by which
hazards are identiﬁed, the risk associated with these hazards is evaluated, and the
means by which the hazard can be eliminated or controlled are determined (18).
The Wisconsin Clinical Laboratory Network (WCLN) is a clinical and public health
laboratory network developed by the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene (WSLH). A
subgroup of this network is a Laboratory Technical Advisory Group (LabTAG) that
assists WSLH in training, educational, and collaborative activities (19). With the overall
goal of improving the culture of biosafety in Wisconsin laboratories, LabTAG developed
a tool that was distributed to WCLN laboratories for the self-performance of a
microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment. The survey nature of this tool facilitated a baseline assessment of a large cohort of clinical and public health laboratories
in the performance of microbiology duties ranging from specimen triage to full culture
analysis.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
A questionnaire for biosafety risk assessment was collaboratively developed by WSLH and LabTAG
and distributed to 150 WCLN laboratories in the fall of 2015. This questionnaire was divided into two
sections. The initial portion of the questionnaire was a facility assessment (assessment of risk on the basis
of the laboratory structure and design), in which laboratories were asked to report their biosafety level
(BSL) status in the context of itemized standards published by U.S. federal agencies (20). The second
portion of the questionnaire was a task assessment (assessment of risk on the basis of the tasks/tests
performed in the laboratory) in which laboratories were requested to scrutinize their risk relative to seven
core activities: specimen collection and transport; specimen processing and handling; rapid nonmolecular, nonserology assays (examples range from rapid inﬂuenza virus antigen detection to HIV antibody
January 2018 Volume 56 Issue 1 e01569-17
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detection using membrane-bound cartridges); direct microscopic examination (including parasitology);
culture setup; performance of screening cultures (either those that involve chromogenic media or those
in which negative plates are discarded and positive plates are shipped to a reference laboratory); and
culture interpretation (including interpretation of routine bacteriology, mycology, mycobacteriology,
and virology cultures). Queries related to task assessment encompassed the preanalytic, analytic, and
postanalytic stages for each core activity. The respondents were asked to indicate their utilization of
required and additional preferred mitigation control measures, as described by the risk assessment
document. Required mitigation controls were those compiled from a number of sources (20–22), while
additional preferred mitigation controls were largely reﬂective of best practices. Questions were written
in a fashion to prompt a yes/no response. Responses of “no” were classiﬁed as biosafety gaps, and the
laboratories were asked to provide commentary on responses of “no.”
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RESULTS
Scope of activity. By early 2016, 103 of 150 laboratories (68.7%) had returned
completed surveys. While all respondents acknowledged participation in at least one
core microbiology activity, the scope of service was variable throughout the WCLN. Of
all the respondents, ⱖ96.1% performed activities related to four core activities: specimen collection and transport; specimen processing and handling; rapid nonmolecular,
nonserology assays; and direct microscopic examination (Table 1). A total of 90.3% of
the laboratories engaged in the primary processing of routine bacterial, fungus, acidfast bacillus (AFB), and/or virus cultures. In contrast, 55.3% and 59.2% of the respondents were involved in screening and increased-complexity culture interpretation,
respectively (Table 1). When assessing laboratory risk in a general sense, the
respondents were more likely to cite specimen source and the speciﬁc clinical test
requisition (e.g., AFB culture, fungus culture) than considerations such as patient
occupation, patient travel history, and the health status of the individuals performing the testing (Table 2).
Facility assessment. According to the 5th edition of Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories (20), 15 minimal criteria must be met for a laboratory to receive
a BSL-1 classiﬁcation. Of the 103 survey respondents, the vast majority reported
compliance with nine of these criteria, with nearly 90% of the respondents having a
laboratory design compatible with cleaning and possession of a hand-washing sink
near the laboratory exit (Table 3). Criteria for BSL-1 status with which the laboratories
had lower rates of compliance included implementation of an effective pest management program (82.5% of the respondents); decontamination of cultures, stocks, and
other infectious materials prior to disposal (76.7%); the presence of screen-ﬁtted
exterior windows (69.9%); and placement of a biohazard sign at the entrance of the
laboratory when infectious agents are present (61.2%). With respect to signage content,
signiﬁcant deﬁcits were additionally noted (and easily corrected) and included the
provision of the laboratory biosafety level, the name of the supervisor or some other
contact, the telephone number for the contact, and the procedure required for entering/exiting the laboratory.
Beyond the aforementioned criteria required for BSL-1 status, 14 additional minimal
criteria must be satisﬁed for BSL-2 classiﬁcation (20). Of the 84 respondents claiming
BSL-2 status, the vast majority demonstrated compliance with eight of these elements.
Almost 90% of the respondents reported the presence of self-closing doors that may be
locked to control access to the laboratory (Table 4). The percentage of laboratories that
decontaminate (by autoclave, incineration, or chemical treatment) potentially infectious laboratory waste prior to disposal and that advise persons entering the laboratory
of the potential presence of hazards was nearly the same for each of these two criteria.
Data showing that less than three-fourths of the respondents open centrifuge safety
cups/carriers in a biosafety cabinet, possess an automatic or manually operated handsfree hand-washing sink, and maintain vacuum lines with HEPA ﬁlters suggest that
additional mitigation steps during these processes would improve biosafety practices
even further, ultimately improving the culture of biosafety.
Nine laboratories self-reported that they were at BSL-3 status, yet no single laboratory satisﬁed all 12 additional minimal criteria for that designation (data not illustrated).
Speciﬁc opportunities for improvement were both operational (annual testing and/or
January 2018 Volume 56 Issue 1 e01569-17
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TABLE 1 Scope of microbiology-related activities among WCLN risk assessment survey
respondents, 2016a

Specimen processing and handling
Specimen handling
Utilization of biosafety cabinet
Specimen receipt
Packaging and shipping of primary specimens
Utilization of chemical fume hood
No engagement in specimen processing and handling
Performance of rapid nonmolecular, nonserology assays for:
Legionella pneumophila
Streptococcus pyogenes
Respiratory syncytial virus
Inﬂuenza virus
Cryptosporidium spp./Giardia spp.
Shiga toxin
Clostridium difﬁcile
Rotavirus
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Other agents
No engagement in rapid nonmolecular, nonserology assays

% of respondents
95.1
93.2
58.3
54.4
50.5
37.8
2.9
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Activity
Specimen collection and transport
Phlebotomy
Specimen transport
Assist with collection of bone marrow aspirate specimens
Collection of nasal swab specimens
Collection of throat swab specimens
Assist with collection of ﬁne-needle aspirate specimens
No engagement in specimen collection and transport

97.1
94.2
94.2
79.6
46.6
1.0

98.1
86.4
71.8
69.9
35.0
25.2
25.2
24.3
22.3
b

3.9

Direct microscopic examination by:
Gram staining
Cell count and differential
Wet mount microscopy
Urinalysis
KOH/calcoﬂuor white staining
AFB staining
Parasitology
Virus immunoﬂuorescence
No engagement in direct microscopic examination

88.3
88.3
88.3
87.4
73.8
20.4
17.5
2.9
3.9

Culture setup for:
Blood culture
Routine bacteria
Fungus
AFB
Virus
No engagement in culture setup

81.6
76.7
30.1
23.3
2.9
9.7

Screening culturesc
Throat swab specimens
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
Urine specimens
Otherd
No engagement in screening cultures

45.6
42.7
38.8
31.1
44.7

Culture interpretation
Routine bacteriology
Fungus
AFB
Virus
No engagement in culture interpretation

59.2
21.4
16.5
2.9
40.8
(Continued on next page)
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TABLE 2 Routine considerations when assessing laboratory risk, WCLN risk assessment
survey respondents, 2016a
Consideration
Specimen source and associated pathogens
Test requisitionb
Method of transmission and infectious dose
Risk factors for persons performing testingc
Patient symptoms and travel history
Patient occupation

% of respondents
100.0
98.1
84.5
81.6
51.5
24.3

aData

are for 103 respondents.
but not limited to, tests for systemic mycotic agents, acid-fast bacilli, viruses, and potential
bioterrorism agents.
cIncluding, but not limited to, immunization status, pregnancy, illness or treatment, physical disability, and
training and experience.
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bIncluding,

replacement of HEPA ﬁlters) and administrative (veriﬁcation and documentation of
parameters and procedures both prior to facility opening and on an annual basis) in
nature. Opportunities for improvements in design were also evident and related to
requirements for impervious, slip-resistant ﬂooring; proper sealing of doors, ventilation
openings, walls, and ceilings; nonreversal of airﬂow in the event of failure conditions;
and HEPA ﬁltering of laboratory exhaust.
Task assessment. Of all the respondents, ⱖ88% complied with 93 of the 121
required mitigation control measures within the task assessment. Items of signiﬁcance
yielding lower levels of compliance are itemized in Tables 5 and 6. With respect to
specimen collection and transport, suboptimal compliance was noted in the donning
of lead gowns by laboratorians assisting in the procurement of computed tomography
(CT)-guided bone marrow or ﬁne-needle aspiration specimens (Table 5). Of 96 respondents utilizing transit tubes (such as pneumatic tube systems), almost 30% did not have
a remediation procedure in the event of breakage. With respect to specimen processing
and handling, nearly 80% of the respondents reported having at least two individuals
who were certiﬁed in the packaging and shipping of infectious substances. However,
less than 70% of these respondents possessed documentation of this training and
ensured subsequent competency.
Common compliance deﬁciencies with respect to not covering biohazardous waste
receptacles when not in use and not using freezer gloves for protection when entering
a freezer were observed over a wide range of disciplines. Deﬁciencies particularly
tended to occur in areas of the laboratory that perform microbiological techniques
outside traditional culture interpretation (Table 5). While 94.2% of the laboratories in
general reported utilizing a biosafety cabinet for culture processing, only 28.2% of the
respondents processed specimens for non-AFB-related direct microscopic examination
in a biosafety cabinet when they were cognizant of the fact that AFB studies of the
specimen were also requested. Sections of the laboratory performing direct microscopic examination also yielded compliance rates of ⬍80% for the proper management
of discarded materials. Sections of the laboratory participating in screening cultures (in
which either a speciﬁc microbe is isolated using chromogenic/selective medium or the
growth obtained by cultivation techniques is referred to another laboratory for iden-

TABLE 1 (Continued)
aData

are for 103 respondents.
nonserology testing for Cryptococcus spp. (17.5%), Campylobacter spp. (12.6%), fecal
inﬂammatory markers (8.7), Plasmodium spp. (6.8%), human immunodeﬁciency virus (6.8%), mononucleosis
(Monospot assay; 5.8%), Trichomonas vaginalis (3.9%), Helicobacter pylori (3.9%), and central nervous system
bacterial antigens (1.9%).
cIncludes the use of colorimetric screening media or screening cultures with the goal of discarding negative
plates and sending positive plates to a reference laboratory.
dIncludes screens for methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus agalactiae, yeast,
ﬂuoroquinolone-resistant Gram-negative bacilli, multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacilli, vancomycinresistant Enterococcus spp., and environmental organisms (endoscopes).
bNonmolecular,
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TABLE 3 Percent compliance with individual BSL-1 requirements, WCLN risk assessment
survey respondents, 2016a
% compliance
89.3
89.3
82.5
76.7
69.9
61.2
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Requirementb
Laboratory design compatible with cleaningc
Hand-washing sink near laboratory exit
Effective pest management program
Decontamination of cultures and other infectious
materials before disposal
Screens on windows opening to the exterior (if present)
Placement of a biohazard sign at the entrance when
infectious agents are present
aData

are for 103 respondents.
that are not speciﬁcally listed here but that met a ⬎90% rate of compliance among the
respondents included (in order of increasing compliance) benchtops impervious to water and resistant to
heat, organic solvents, and other chemicals; access to laboratory controlled by doors; safe handling of
sharps; procedures to minimize splashes and/or aerosols; decontamination of work surfaces; availability of
personal protective equipment; prohibition of food, drink, smoking, cosmetic application, and contact lens
handling; availability of mechanical pipetting devices; and appropriate personnel training regarding duties
and prevention of exposure.
cExamples include nonporous chair coverings and the absence of carpets and rugs.
bRequirements

tiﬁcation) often failed to employ proper personal protective equipment during various
phases of culture management.
Many opportunities for improvement in the microbiology laboratories were related
to the manipulation of particularly hazardous organisms. Of all the respondents, 75.4%
reported performing potentially aerosol-generating work with high-risk bacterial
pathogens in a functional biosafety cabinet using BSL-3 practices (controlled access to
the area when work is in progress; decontamination of all waste; wearing of a
solid-front gown with cuffed sleeves, gloves, and an N-95 respirator; Table 6). A total of
76.5% of the respondents reported that all work with AFB was performed with BSL-3
practices. Approximately one-half of the work with suspect systemic fungi was accompanied by the use of BSL-3 practices, and less than 75% of the respondents visually
notify fellow laboratorians of ongoing work with these suspect cultures.
Other task assessments came under the auspices of additional preferred mitigation
control measures. Within the realm of specimen collection and transport, 9.2% of 98
respondents utilized optimal protective eyewear during phlebotomy for the collection
of blood for culture (data not illustrated), while 46.9% disinfected areas where blood is
drawn when the patient is known to harbor an organism of nosocomial signiﬁcance.
Less than 40% of the respondents inquired about a signiﬁcant travel history before
specimen procurement. With respect to specimen processing and handling, 46.0% of
the respondents processed all microbiology-related specimens in a biosafety cabinet; in

TABLE 4 Percent compliance with additional requirements constituting BSL-2 status,
WCLN risk assessment survey respondents, 2016a
Requirementb
Have self-closing doors that may be locked to control access
Decontaminate potentially hazardous laboratory waste before disposal
Advise persons entering laboratory about potential hazards or have
them meet speciﬁc entry/exit requirements
Open centrifuge safety carriers only in a biosafety cabinet
Have an automatic or manually operated hands-free hand-washing sink
Protect vacuum lines with HEPA ﬁlters or equivalent

% compliance
89.3
82.1
78.6
72.6
71.4
59.5

aData

are for 84 respondents.
not speciﬁcally listed in Table 4 that met a ⬎90% rate of compliance among the respondents
included (in order of increasing compliance) the availability of a biosafety manual, prohibition of plants
from the laboratory, removal of personal protective equipment prior to leaving for nonlaboratory areas,
decontamination of laboratory equipment after splashes with contaminated material and on a routine basis,
performance of procedures involving manipulation of infectious materials that may generate an aerosol in a
class II biosafety cabinet, offering of immunizations and medical surveillance to laboratory personnel,
demonstration of competency in standard and special microbiology practices, and immediate evaluation
and documentation of exposure incidents (with treatment provision).

bRequirements
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TABLE 5 Selected functions reﬂective of required microbiology mitigation controls, with
percent compliance among WCLN risk assessment survey respondents, 2016
% compliance

39
60

59.0
45.0

96
82

70.8
68.3

82

62.2

100

68.0

Cover partially ﬁlled waste receptacles when not used
Nonmolecular, nonserologic assays
Direct microscopic examination
Screening cultures
Culture interpretation

98
89
59
52

82.7
65.2
74.6
82.7

Use freezer gloves for specimen storage
Specimen processing and handling
Nonmolecular, nonserologic assays
Screening cultures
Culture interpretation

95
97
60
54

42.1
52.6
55.0
57.4

103

28.2

89
89

78.7
79.8

93
103
103
60

84.9
54.4
52.4
26.7

Have a procedure for remediation of transit tube breakage
Document packaging/shipping certiﬁcation for two
laboratorians
Provide refresher packaging/shipping training (plus
competency) every 2 yr
Split primary specimen for AFB/fungus culture in biosafety
cabinet

Process specimens for direct microscopic examination in a
biosafety cabinet when specimen also requires testing
for AFB
Double-bag waste (direct microscopic examination)
Ensure that the sharps container does not exceed 2/3 vol
(direct microscopic examination)
Use proper personal protective equipment (culture setup)
Follow written procedures (screening cultures)
Wear a laboratory coat (screening cultures)
Use proper personal protective equipment during culture
retention (screening cultures)
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No. of qualiﬁed
respondents

Required mitigation control
Wear a lead gown when assisting with CT-guided:
Fine-needle aspiration
Bone marrow aspiration

terms of microbiology culture requisitions, 60.2% of the laboratories processed the
specimens in a biosafety cabinet. A total of 48.5% of the available biosafety cabinets
possessed an audible airﬂow alarm.
A total of 26.0% of the respondents performing specimen processing and handling
reported the use of an additional preferred mitigation control measure in which

TABLE 6 Selected functions more reﬂective of required microbiology mitigation controls
in the traditional microbiology culture interpretation setting with percent compliance
among WCLN risk assessment survey respondents, 2016
Required mitigation control
Perform aerosol-generating work in a biosafety cabinet with
BSL-3 practices (high-risk bacterial pathogen)
Perform all work with AFB in a biosafety cabinet with BSL-3
practices
Perform all potential work with systemic fungi in a
biosafety cabinet with BSL-3 practices
Perform all culture work with suspect or highly pathogenic
viruses in a biosafety cabinet with BSL-3 practices
Post a sign warning others when working with systemic
fungus cultures
Post a sign warning others when working with AFB cultures
Decontaminate waste (including liquid) from highly
pathogenic microbes prior to disposal
January 2018 Volume 56 Issue 1 e01569-17

No. of qualiﬁed
respondents
61

% compliance
75.4

17

76.5

22

54.5

3

33.3

22

50.0

17
52

70.6
69.2
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specimen tubes are uncapped with the assistance of gauze or a suitable disinfectant
(data not illustrated); 27.0% of the respondents donned additional personal protective
equipment when the specimen is known to emanate from a patient housed under
aerosol or droplet precautions. Similar percentages of respondents reported that they
performed these additional mitigation control measures in the context of rapid nonmolecular, nonserology assays. Should these assays require mixing or vortexing, 47.5%
of the respondents performed these steps in a biosafety cabinet. Of the 103 respondents performing direct microscopic examination, 35.0% prepared the slides in a
biosafety cabinet. A total of 18.4% added BSL-3 practices if the specimen is known to
emanate from a patient housed under aerosol or droplet precautions.
DISCUSSION
Proper biosafety practices and mitigation control measures are essential elements of
a culture of laboratory biosafety to protect laboratory professionals from signiﬁcant
exposures and laboratory-acquired infections. A heightened awareness of the need for
a strong culture of laboratory biosafety has arisen in response to the increasing
potential for encountering highly virulent and/or highly antimicrobial-resistant organisms in routine clinical practice (23), making sentinel observations of purported bioterrorism agents (24), and properly managing biological select agents (25). The assurance
of biosafety is not restricted to facility-related provisions or other engineering controls;
human behaviors also contribute to the implementation of a culture of laboratory
biosafety. An international survey of 23 BSL-3 and -4 facilities (26) revealed that while
the incidence of laboratory-acquired infections was extremely low, the underlying
cause for nearly 80% of these laboratory-acquired infections was human error. Taken
together, one element crucial to a culture of laboratory biosafety is identiﬁcation of
a champion for this cause in each individual laboratory. This individual may have the
title of medical director, certiﬁed clinical microbiologist, principal investigator, or
dedicated laboratory biosafety ofﬁcer and must demonstrate commitment to ongoing
staff education, training, and proﬁciency monitoring.
The performance of a biosafety risk assessment constitutes an important initial
measure to ensure this culture of biosafety. A standardized risk assessment questionnaire (inclusive of applicable deﬁnitions, required standards, and optimal mitigation
controls) was distributed to laboratorians at 150 WCLN sites. The advantages of
distributing this tool in such a manner include the opportunity for bench-level laboratorian participation in the completion of the risk assessment questionnaire. Past
surveys conducted in the context of hospital safety (27, 28) have demonstrated that
laboratorians are more apt than physicians or nonclinical hospital employees to answer
the questions that have been posed in a less positive fashion and to delineate
infrastructure deﬁciencies. When extrapolated to the current survey, the implied
greater knowledge of current state of practice and/or the genuine frankness of the
response from laboratorians would contribute to a baseline of data on which educational or improvement efforts may be developed. Another strength of this project is
that the information obtained is generalizable to both clinical laboratories and laboratory networks in other states and regions because of the broad scope of the
laboratories surveyed. The 103 laboratories that provided responses to the questionnaire ranged from those performing 16,000 billable tests per year to those performing
up to 5.3 million billable tests per year, served various levels of acuity, and were
distributed in both rural and urban regions of Wisconsin (56% of the laboratories were
located in communities with populations of less than 25,000). Nearly all respondents
were engaged in activities related to specimen collection and transport; over 90%
processed primary clinical specimens for routine bacterial, fungus, AFB, and/or virus
culture (Table 1).
Overall data from this exercise indicate a reasonable level of compliance with
required and best practice mitigation controls within the network of clinical laboratories surveyed. In terms of task assessment, over 88% of the respondents fell within
compliance for more than three-quarters of the required mitigation control measures
January 2018 Volume 56 Issue 1 e01569-17
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listed in the risk assessment. At the same time, the opportunities for laboratory biosafety
improvement identiﬁed include those related to the acquisition of the patient/clinical
history for certain primary clinical specimens (Table 2), the discernment of laboratory
biosafety level status (Tables 3 and 4), the performance of microbiology-related tasks by
laboratory generalists (Table 5), and the manipulation of specimens derived from
certain at-risk patients (such as those with infections with systemic fungi or Mycobacterium spp.; Table 6). At the same time, it should be noted that reference, public health,
and other tertiary laboratories may not have direct access to data regarding the
infection control or isolation status of certain patients.
A number of factors could explain the decreased rates of compliance with certain
aspects of the risk assessment. It is possible that the yes/no format for providing answers
to the risk assessment questionnaire may have limited the ability of the respondents to
answer certain questions to the fullest degree of accuracy because of variable circumstances at a given institution. As an example, in the context of BSL-1 practices, less than
80% of the respondents reported that they decontaminated cultures, stocks, and other
infectious materials prior to disposal. It is possible that laboratories that reported noncompliance with this questionnaire item instead ship biohazardous waste to an off-site decontamination facility for disposal through a commercial vendor. Other items within the risk
assessment may have been subject to misinterpretation or other mitigating circumstances
that could not be captured through the format used for questioning.
Decreased rates of compliance with elements of a biosafety risk assessment may
additionally be a function of complacency within the laboratory. Complacency can be
deﬁned as a human risk factor that is a result of boredom and a lack of responsible
leadership. Managerial or peer accountability is one means of controlling for complacency
(Sean Kaufman, Behavioral-Based Improvement Solutions, personal communication). An
observation of 93 laboratorians employed across 21 BSL-2 facilities at a U.S. university
documented an average of 2.6 hand-to-face contacts per working hour, with over 80% of
these contacts involving the nose or forehead (29). The frequency of such contacts was
determined to be a function of the perception of an infectious risk, as workers who
perceived that greater health risks were associated with the agent(s) studied in the
particular laboratory were less likely to touch their face. In 2016, CDC revealed a national
tuberculosis incidence rate of 2.9 cases per 100,000 persons, with the incidence rate in
Wisconsin being 0.7 cases per 100,000 persons (30), which was the lowest among the ﬁve
states constituting the East North Central division. Nearly two-thirds of the cultureconﬁrmed tuberculosis cases in Wisconsin emanate from the top two population centers of
the state (Laura Louison, WSLH, personal communication). Therefore, the low prevalence of
tuberculosis in most regions of Wisconsin and the perceived low risk of laboratory-acquired
infection due to Mycobacterium tuberculosis may translate into a sense of laboratory
complacency for some and contribute to selected lower rates of compliance with the
traditional microbiology laboratory items assessed in Table 6.
Finally, intrinsic knowledge and educational efforts can contribute to a general
culture of laboratory biosafety. Odetokun et al. (31) reported that 5.4% of participants
in a survey of Nigeria veterinary laboratories demonstrated a satisfactory knowledge of
laboratory biosafety and security, while 94.6% demonstrated poor knowledge. Among
the researchers, 25.7% and 74.3% were documented to have high and low levels of
awareness about biosafety, respectively. Ghanchi et al. (32) reported 40%, 66%, and
74% rates of acknowledgment of the importance of disinfection, personal protective
equipment, and biohazardous waste disposal, respectively, as part of biosafety practices during antimicrobial susceptibility testing in Pakistani clinical laboratories. A risk
assessment of gain-of-function research (33) acknowledged gaps in knowledge about
biosafety in the United States and concluded that governments should invest a fraction
of their funding support in the prevention of biological accidents and subsequent
laboratory-acquired infections. While the degrees of education and vocational requirements can vary globally, it is imperative that microbiologists develop and maintain
competency in facets of biosafety, including those related to updates in mitigation
control practices.
jcm.asm.org 9

Munson et al.

Journal of Clinical Microbiology

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by an Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity, Project E
Laboratory Biosafety grant from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
We express sincere gratitude to all of the laboratories that participated in the WCLN
risk assessment.

REFERENCES
1. Singh K. 2009. Laboratory-acquired infections. Clin Infect Dis 49:142–147.
https://doi.org/10.1086/599104.
2. Pike RM. 1976. Laboratory-associated infections: summary and analysis
of 3921 cases. Health Lab Sci 13:105–114.
3. Pike RM. 1978. Past and present hazards of working with infectious
agents. Arch Pathol Lab Med 102:333–336.
4. Pike RM. 1979. Laboratory-associated infections: incidence, fatalities,
causes and prevention. Annu Rev Microbiol 33:41– 66. https://doi.org/
10.1146/annurev.mi.33.100179.000353.
5. Grist NR, Emslie JA. 1991. Infections in British clinical laboratories, 19881989. J Clin Pathol 44:667– 669. https://doi.org/10.1136/jcp.44.8.667.
6. Baron EJ, Miller JM. 2008. Bacterial and fungal infections among diagnostic laboratory workers: evaluating the risks. Diagn Microbiol Infect Dis
60:241–246. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diagmicrobio.2007.09.016.
7. Sewell DL. 1995. Laboratory-associated infections and biosafety. Clin
Microbiol Rev 8:389 – 405.
8. Hilmarsdottir I, Coutellier A, Elbaz J, Klein JM, Datry A, Guého E, Herson
S. 1994. A French case of laboratory-acquired disseminated Penicillium
marneffei infection in a patient with AIDS. Clin Infect Dis 19:357–358.
https://doi.org/10.1093/clinids/19.2.357.
9. Cooper CR, Dixon DM, Salkin IF. 1992. Laboratory-acquired sporotrichosis. J
Med Vet Mycol 30:169–171. https://doi.org/10.1080/02681219280000221.
10. West DL. 1984. The risk of hepatitis B infection among health care
professionals in the United States: a review. Am J Med Sci 287:26 –33.
11. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2008. Surveillance for acute
viral hepatitis—United States, 2006. MMWR Surveill Summ 57:1–24.
12. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1992. Surveillance for occupationally acquired HIV infection—United States, 1981-1992. MMWR
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 41:823– 825.
13. Herwaldt BL. 2001. Laboratory-acquired parasitic infections from accidental exposures. Clin Microbiol Rev 14:659 – 688. https://doi.org/10
.1128/CMR.14.3.659-688.2001.
14. Seetharam V, Khanna V, Jaiprakash P, Kosaraju K, Thomas J, Mukhopadhayay C. 2012. Primary hydatid cyst of the kidney and ureter with
hydatiduria in a laboratory worker: a case report. Case Rep Nephrol
2012:596923. https://doi.org/10.1155/2012/596923.
15. Silver S. 2015. Laboratory-acquired lethal infections by potential bioweapons pathogens including Ebola in 2014. FEMS Microbiol Lett 362:
1– 6. https://doi.org/10.1093/femsle/fnu008.
January 2018 Volume 56 Issue 1 e01569-17

16. Jacobson JT, Orlob RB, Clayton JL. 1985. Infections acquired in clinical
laboratories in Utah. J Clin Microbiol 21:486 – 489.
17. International Organization for Standardization. 2009. Risk management
vocabulary. ISO guide 73:2009. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland.
18. Health Canada. 2004. The laboratory biosafety guidelines, 3rd ed. Public
Health Agency of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
19. Munson E, Block TK, Bowles EJ, Costello M, Dern R, Fritsche TR, Helgesen
MA, Kropp JL, Podzorski RP, Siebers K, Simmons B, Smith MA, SprayLarson F, Van TT, Warshauer D. 2016. Surveillance of Wisconsin antibacterial susceptibility patterns. Wisc Med J 115:29 –36.
20. Chosewood LC, Wilson DE (ed). 2009. Biosafety in microbiological and
biomedical laboratories, 5th ed. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Washington, DC.
21. World Health Organization. 2004. Laboratory biosafety manual, 3rd ed.
World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
22. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Occupational exposure
to bloodborne pathogens. 29 CFR Part 1910.1030. U.S. Department of
Labor, Washington, DC.
23. Gu D, Dong N, Zheng Z, Lin D, Huang M, Wang L, Chan EW, Shu L, Yu J,
Zhang R, Chen S. 29 August 2017. A fatal outbreak of ST11 carbapenemresistant hypervirulent Klebsiella pneumoniae in a Chinese hospital: a
molecular epidemiological study. Lancet Infect Dis. https://doi.org/10
.1016/S1473-3099(17)30489-9.
24. Klietmann WF, Ruoff KL. 2001. Bioterrorism: implications for the clinical
microbiologist. Clin Microbiol Rev 14:364 –381. https://doi.org/10.1128/
CMR.14.2.364-381.2001.
25. Henkel RD, Miller T, Weyant RS. 2012. Monitoring select agent theft, loss,
and release reports in the United States—2004-2010. Appl Biosaf 17:
171–180. https://doi.org/10.1177/153567601201700402.
26. Wurtz N, Papa A, Hukic M, Di Caro A, Leparc-Goffart I, Leroy E, Landini
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